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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-2(3)(2)(j) and the 
Utah Constitution, Art. VIII, § 3. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES, STANDARD OF REVIEW, AND PRESERVATION 
1. Is the February 2004 independent investigative report ("Investigative 
Report" or "Report") commissioned by Salt Lake County concerning whether the Chief 
Deputy County Clerk engaged in persistent and egregious sexual harassment of 
subordinate employees, and what County officials knew and did about such misconduct, a 
public record under GRAMA? 
Standard of Review: Whether the Investigative Report is properly classified as a 
public record under GRAMA presents a question of law that is reviewed for correctness, 
giving no deference to the trial court. See Young v. Salt Lake County, 2002 UT 70, \ 5, 
52 P.3d 1240, 1242; R.A. McKell Excavating, Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank N.A., 2004 UT 
48, f 7, 100 P.3d 1159, 1161; Grynberg v. Questar Pipeline Co., 2003 UT 8, % 20, 70 
P.3dl ,6 . 
2* Did the trial court err in concluding that the Investigative Report is properly 
classified as a private record under Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-302(2)(d)? 
Standard of Review: Whether the Investigative Report is properly classified as a 
private record pursuant to Utah Code § 63-2-302(2)(d) presents a question of law that is 
reviewed for correctness, giving no deference to the trial court. See id. 
-1 -
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classified ,r- J pM^I'vled MVOKI \\\u\v\ 1 1Mb (1ode ^ 63-2-304(9)? 
Standard of Review: Whether the Investigative Report is properly classified as a 
protected record under Utah Code § 63-2-304(9) presents a question u) law uu; 
reviewed for correctness, giving no defei . . 
4. I) I iilin1 in il " nun! in in lii'liii" in segregate any information in the 
In vesti native Report that may properly be classified as non-public from information that 
is public and order release of a redacted version of the Investigative Report containing the 
public information ' 
H
 v t b applied GRAMA's 
M*i'i «^* it • • ovision - Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-307 - presents a question of law ;lu; ;-
reviewed for correctness, giving in - deference to the trial court. See uL 
Preservation of Issues. ,or Appcllult Hi i it111". Il he Mt t >////(t; A't n s pirpi il\ 
presei \ , - * •j'.^nrj. ISXI-- --•- i • ''inr*!ainl (Record on Appeal 
l'u R ""l) I • .1 lominp News' Motion for Summary Judgment (R. J : KSJ, Memorandum in 
Support of the Morning News' Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 314); Reply 
Memorandum in Nuppi/il wi !!JV.-.;..;///;;;^ w ! c M e n u 
»;»; i M ,: "•'«••' ' * ** ' Partial Summary hd.emenl <R. ^ J , ; , 
Memorandum Decision (R. 593 (see Addendui \\ Tab f)Y»; Transcript of Proceedings 
Before Judge Medley (April 5, 2006) (R. 630); and Notice of Appea. - • ^ 
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DETERMINATIVE LAW 
Utah's open records statute - the Utah Government Records Access and 
Management Act, Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-101, et seq. ("GRAMA") - is of central 
importance to this appeal and is set forth verbatim in Tab E of the accompanying 
Addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition Below. 
This case concerns whether the public and press are entitled under GRAMA to 
learn the contents of an independently commissioned investigative report that 
substantiated allegations of official misconduct by a high-ranking Salt Lake County 
official. In September 2004, a Morning News reporter filed a GRAMA request for the 
independent Investigative Report, which concerned allegations that Chief Deputy County 
Clerk Nick Floros engaged in a pattern of egregious and persistent sexual harassment of a 
subordinate employee, Marcia Rice, and possibly other County employees, and that 
County officials knew about the misconduct but continued to employ him. The County 
denied the request. After appealing the denial through three levels of administrative 
review within the County - and being denied at each level - the Morning News initiated 
this action seeking access to the Investigative Report. 
The Morning News' Complaint requests the following relief: (i) that the Court 
declare that the Investigative Report is a public record under GRAMA and order its 
- 3 -
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immediate release, (ii) to the extent the Court determines the Investigative Report 
contains some information properly classified as non-public under GRAMA, that the 
Court order redaction of the non-public information and release of the public information, 
and (iii) if the Court finds that the County properly classified the Investigative Report, in 
its entirety, as "private" or "protected" under GRAMA, that the Court order release of the 
Report pursuant to Section 404(8) of GRAMA because the public interests in disclosure 
outweigh the interests in nondisclosure. 
The Morning News and the County filed cross-motions for summary judgment on 
the issue of whether the Investigative Report was properly classified a private or 
protected record under GRAMA. In its Memorandum Decision entered April 5, 2006, the 
trial court held that the Investigative Report was properly classified as a private or 
protected record and, consequently, granted the County's motion and denied the Morning 
Newsy motion. The Morning News appeals this order.1 
1
 By Order dated May 11, 2006, the trial court certified its Memorandum Decision 
as a final order for purposes of appeal pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure ("Certification Order"). (R. 608). The trial court's Memorandum Decision 
and Certification Order wholly disposed of the Morning News' First Claim for Relief and 
finally adjudicated the issue of the proper classification, under GRAMA, of the 
Investigative Report. So that the Memorandum Decision could be certified properly as a 
final order for purposes of this appeal, the Morning News dismissed without prejudice its 
claim that the Investigative Report, even if properly classified, should be released 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-404(8). The only claims pending in the trial court are 
the Morning News' claims for declaratory and injunctive relief and attorneys' fees, which 
are wholly dependent upon resolution of the issues presented in this appeal. 
185229.2 
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II. Statement of Facts. 
A. Marcia Rice's Allegations of Sexual Harassment Against Chief Deputy 
Clerk P. Nick Floros. 
In November 2003, Marcia Rice, an employee in the Salt Lake County Clerk's 
Office (the "Clerk's Office"), filed a written complaint of sexual harassment against P. 
Nick Floros, the Chief Deputy Salt Lake County Clerk (R. 314 at viii (citing R. 329); see 
also R. 127-28 & attachment thereto). Rice supplemented her initial complaint by filing a 
follow-up report in November 2003 and a Notice of Claim in July 2004. (R. 314 at viii 
(citing R. 329); see also R. 127-28 & attachment thereto at 1; R. 441). Rice claimed that 
Floros helped her obtain a position in the Clerk's Office for which she was not qualified 
and then engaged in a persistent pattern of improper sexual advances and sexual 
harassment. (Id.). 
Among other things, Rice alleged that Floros (i) during work hours removed his 
penis from his pants, rubbed it and asked Rice to perform oral sex and engage in other 
sexual conduct with him; (ii) asked Rice about her sexual relationships and made 
numerous comments to her of a sexual nature, including that he fantasized about her all 
the time and got an erection every time she walked into the room; (iii) called Rice at 
home to discuss work-related topics and would then discuss the pornographic film he was 
watching, describe to her what was happening, and invite her to engage in similar 
behavior; (iv) on at least one occasion, walked up behind Rice in her office, began 
rubbing her shoulders, leaned down and started kissing her neck while he simultaneously 
- 5 -
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reached his hands down the front of Rice's dress and fondled her breasts; and (v) on 
several occasions, indicated to Rice that he had an erection. (R. 314 at viii-ix (citing R. 
441-42); see also R. 353-54; R. 371). 
Rice claimed that Floros punished and retaliated against her when she did not 
return his advances. (R. 314 at viii-ix (citing R. 329-31, R. 441-42)). Rice further 
alleged that Floros had previously engaged in similar behavior with at least one other 
female County employee and that County officials knew about Floros' improper behavior 
but continued to employ him. (R. 314 at ix (citing R. 441)). Rice's initial complaint was 
brought to the attention of Sherrie Swensen, Salt Lake County Clerk. (R. 314 at ix (citing 
R. 329)). Swensen advised Floros that a complaint had been filed and placed him on 
administrative leave pending a final determination of the allegations. (Id.). 
B. The Partial Summary of the Independent Investigation and Report 
Contained in the Soltis Letter. 
Because of County Clerk Swensen's "long-term professional relationship with 
Floros and her goal of complete objectivity and fair play," she delegated the investigation 
of Rice's allegations to the Litigation Division of the Salt Lake County District 
Attorney's Office, headed by District Attorney David E. Yocum. (R. 314 at x (citing R. 
329)). Both Swensen and Yocum were elected to their respective offices on the 
Democratic Party ticket. In a further effort "to maintain complete objectivity and fair 
play/' the District Attorney's Office commissioned an independent panel to investigate 
the allegations (Id.). The County hired "two extremely competent and respected 
- 6 -
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employment attorneys" to conduct the investigation and prepare written findings, 
conclusions and recommendations. (Id.). 
In February 2004, after more than 100 hours of investigation and the expenditure 
of approximately $11,000 in taxpayer funds, the independent investigators completed 
their report (the "Investigative Report") and delivered it to the District Attorney's Office. 
(R. 314 at x (citing R. 329); see also R. 340 & Tab 2 thereto). On February 11, 2004, 
John Soltis, Director of the District Attorney's Litigation Division, sent Rice a letter (the 
"Soltis Letter") purporting to summarize the independent investigators' findings and 
recommendations and to report the administrative action to be taken by the County in 
response to such findings and recommendations. (R. 314 at xxi (citing R. 329)). The 
Soltis Letter is a public record, and its content was extensively reported by the local news 
media. (R. 314 at xxi-xxiii (citing R. 323, 329-40); see also R. 351-52). 
Soltis stated in his letter that he found the Investigative Report "to be very well 
reasoned, fair and complete^]" (R. 314 at xxi (citing R. 330)). Among other things, the 
Soltis Letter reported the following: 
• the investigators concluded that the evidence substantiated Rice's 
complaint; 
• the investigators concluded that Floros had engaged in unwelcome sexual 
conduct and advances toward Rice and punished her for not reciprocating; 
• Floros' conduct constituted "egregious violations" of County policy; 
- 7 -
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• the investigators would have recommended that Floros be immediately 
terminated and considered ineligible for future employment with the County; Floros, 
however, retired just three days before the investigators delivered their report; and 
• because Floros retired, "administrative-disciplinary action based on the 
investigators' findings and recommendation is presently unnecessary." (Id.). 
Although the Soltis Letter stated that the investigators also focused their 
investigation on the employment history of the parties, management style, treatment of 
subordinates, and "appropriate management response/' the letter reported no findings, 
conclusions or recommendations of the investigators concerning those subject matters. 
(R. 314 at xxi (citing R. 329-31)). Specifically, the Soltis Letter reported no information 
concerning whether the investigators looked into Rice's allegations that Floros sexually 
harassed other subordinate female employees and that County managers knew about such 
misconduct but refused to do anything about it. (Id.). 
C. The Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations of the Investigative 
Report. 
[See "SEALED SUBMISSION OF APPELLANT CONCERNING CONTENT OF 
INVESTIGATIVE REPORT" (Submitted Under Seal).]2 
2
 Pursuant to the trial court's Order Granting the Morning Newsy Motion to 
Compel and for Entry of a Protective Order (Aug. 30, 2005) and Protective Order (Aug. 
30, 2005) (R. 208, 234), Section C of this Statement of Facts, describing the content of 
the Investigative Report that has not been made public, and Section IV of the Argument 
are submitted separately under seal. 
185229 2 
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D. The Public Controversy Concerning the Floros Investigation. 
The Floros investigation became the subject of a heated political controversy 
among members of the Salt Lake County Council. (R. 314 at xxii-xxiii (citing R. 322-24, 
R. 341-45, R. 347-52)). According to the Soltis Letter, the District Attorney's Office 
retained the independent attorney investigators to conduct the Floros investigation "[i]n 
an effort to maintain complete objectivity and fair play." (R. 314 at x (citing R. 329)). 
Questions were raised, however, after the District Attorney's Office refused to release the 
independent Investigative Report upon its completion. (R. 314 at xxii-xxiii (citing R. 
322-24, R. 341-45, R. 347-52)). Local newspaper reports quoted Republican Council 
members charging that District Attorney Yocum soft-pedaled the investigation because 
Floros was a friend and fellow Democrat. (R. 314 at xxiii (citing R. 347)). Republican 
Council members compared Yocum's handling of the Nancy Workman case, in which 
former County Mayor Workman (a Republican) was charged with felony misuse of public 
funds, with his handling of the Floros case, in which Floros (a Democrat) was allowed to 
quietly retire just days before the independent Investigative Report was issued. (R. 314 at 
xxii (citing R. 341-45)). 
District Attorney Yocum and Democratic Council members defended the 
investigation, responding that a criminal investigation or prosecution of Floros was 
unwarranted because Rice was not interested in pursuing criminal charges, a claim that 
Rice, through her attorney, disputed. (Id.). Ultimately, although the County Council met 
- 9 -
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in closed session to discuss whether to conduct its own investigation into Yocum's 
handling of the Floros matter, no such investigation was conducted. (Id.; see also R. 348-
50). 
E. The EEOC Determination of Discrimination and Rice's Federal 
Lawsuit Against Salt Lake County, Swensen, and Floros. 
On July 14, 2004, Rice filed a Notice of Claim against the County advising that 
she intended to pursue claims against the County and Floras, describing, in detail, Floras' 
alleged misconduct, charging that Floros engaged in similar misconduct with at least one 
other female County employee, and that County officials knew of Floras' misconduct but 
continued to employ him. (R. 314 at xxiii (citing R. 441-42)). 
On July 30, 2004, the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission issued its 
determination on the merits of Rice's sexual harassment complaint (the "EEOC 
Determination"). The EEOC determined that reasonable cause existed to believe that the 
County discriminated against Rice by sexually harassing her, and retaliated against her 
and "at least one other individual by harassing them when they rejected a supervisor's 
sexual advances, in violation of Title VII." (R. 314 at xxiv (citing R. 353-54)). 
On October 6, 2004, Rice filed a federal civil rights lawsuit against the County, 
County Clerk Swensen, and Floros, alleging sexual harassment and retaliation. (Id. 
(citing R. 355-73)). Rice alleged in her complaint that Swensen hired Floros knowing 
that he had a history of harassing behavior toward other Salt Lake County employees. 
(Id. (citing R. 358)). Rice further alleged that after hiring Floros, Swensen was 
- 10 -
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specifically informed in writing that Floros was "creating a hostile environment" by 
"inappropriate touching and invasion of 'personal space'" and "continual, improper and 
uncalled for staring and watching employees." Rice alleged that Swensen did nothing to 
prevent Floros5 alleged misconduct or to protect subordinate employees. (Id.). 
Rice's Notice of Claim, the EEOC Determination, and Rice's Complaint in the 
federal court proceeding are public records that were extensively reported upon by the 
local news media. (R. 314 at xxiii (citing R. 441-42); R. 314 at xxiv (citing R. 353-54); 
Id (citing 355-73); R. 314 at xxii-xxiii (citing R. 322-24, R. 341-45, R. 347-52)). In 
addition, during the federal court litigation, the County produced copies of the 
Investigative Report to Rice, Floros, Swensen, and their respective counsel pursuant to a 
stipulated protective order that required the parties to keep the Report confidential. (R. 
314 at xxv (citing R. 159-73); R. 134 n. 2). 
Rice and the County subsequently settled the federal lawsuit, with the County 
paying Rice and her attorney nearly $100,000.00. (R. 555 at Tab 17). 
F. The Morning News' GRAMA Request for the Investigative Report and 
Judicial Appeal of Denial. 
In September 2004 - eight months after Floros retired from the County and at the 
height of the political controversy surrounding the District Attorney's handling of the 
Floros investigation - the Morning News submitted a GRAMA request to the County for 
a copy of the Investigative Report. (R. 314 at xxv-xxvi (citing R. 3, 28)). The County 
denied the request, claiming the Report was properly classified as a "private" or 
- 1 1 -
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"protected" record under GRAMA. (Id.). The Morning News appealed the denial 
through three levels of administrative review within the County, and was denied at each 
level. (R. 314 at xxvi-xxviii (citing R. 6, 12-15, 322-26, 374-73)). Despite the Morning 
News' request, nongjjf the County GRAMA appeal authorities actually reviewed the 
Investigative Report before ruling on the merits gLtJie Morning News' appeal. (Id.). 
On December 14, 2004, during the final administrative appeal hearing before the 
Salt Lake County Council, counsel for the Morning News requested that the Council 
conduct an in camera review of the Report to determine whether the record was properly 
classified under GRAMA. (R. 314 at xxvii (citing R. 467); see also R. 4 ^ 10; R. 28 f 5). 
The District Attorney's Office objected, however, stating that the District Attorney would 
seek a court order preventing the Council from reviewing the Investigative Report. (R. 
314 at xxviii (citing R. 467); see also R. 12 at 2). 
On December 21, 2004, the County Council reconvened and determined that an in 
camera review of the Report by the Council was appropriate and necessary (i) to 
determine whether the Report was properly classified; (ii) to comply with the Council's 
statutory duty to segregate and release information that the requester is entitled to inspect; 
and (iii) to weigh the various interests and public policies favoring disclosure and 
nondisclosure of the Report (R. 314 at xxviii (citing 472-73); see also R. 12-13). 
However, to avoid the substantial delay and expense associated with litigation over the 
issue of whether the Council had the right to review the Investigative Report, and to 
- 1 2 -
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expedite judicial consideration of the merits of the Morning News' GRAMA appeal, the 
Council issued an order, stipulated to by the Morning News and the District Attorney's 
Office, denying the Morning News' GRAMA appeal and certifying such order as final for 
purposes of petitioning the District Court for relief {Id.). 
On January 12, 2005, the Morning News filed its Complaint seeking judicial 
review of the County's denial of its GRAMA request, as provided under Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 63-2-402(1 )(b) and 63-2-404. The Morning News sought a judicial declaration that the 
Investigative Report is a public record and ordering the County to release it. (R. 9-10). 
The Morning News and the County filed cross-motions for summary judgment on the 
issue of whether the Investigative Report was properly classified a private or protected 
record under GRAMA. (R. 308-14, R. 555). 
G. The Trial Court's Memorandum Decision. 
On April 5, 2006 - more than a year-and-a-half after the Morning News submitted 
its GRAMA request for the Investigative Report - the trial court issued its Memorandum 
Decision ruling that the Report was properly classified as a private or protected record. 
Consequently, the court granted the County's motion and denied the Morning News9 
motion. (R. 593-602; see also Tab D to Addendum). 
The trial court based its ruling on two conclusions. First, in finding that release of 
the Investigative Report would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal 
privacy under Section 302(2)(d) of GRAMA, the court asserted that it was Floros whose 
- 1 3 -
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privacy would be unjustly invaded if the Report - which substantiated allegations about 
Floras' misconduct as & public official - were released. This conclusion was notbased^oa^ 
a finding that the Report contained baseless allegations about Floras, but rather on the ***** ^ *V 
—
 h
 \«>clfr 
fact that the Report was independent and credible. The court stated, "[rjeason dictates ^ e»* 
that there exists within the contents of the full investigative report more express 
information concerning the alleged perpetrator [Floras] than exists in the Soltis letter, and 
more even-handed findings than can be found in the allegations contained in the [Marcia 
Rice] federal [lawsuit] or EEOC complaints. This is information, unique to the &S AN 
investigative report, the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted^ ^ "^  
invasion of the alleged perpetrator's privacy;" (R. 593 (emphasis added)). Accordingly, 
the trial court concluded the Investigative Report was properly classified as a private 
record under Section 302(2)(d) of GRAMA. 
Second, even though the investigation into Floras' conduct had long been 
concluded, and even though the County did not identify any specific investigation that 
would be compromised by release of the Report, the trial court held that release of the 
Investigative Report "reasonably could be expected to interfere" with future 
investigations or disciplinary or enforcement proceedings, meaning the Report was 
properly classified as a protected record under Section 304(9) of GRAMA. (R. 599-600). 
This conclusion was based on the trial court's sweeping assertion that, "in the public's 
eyes," a determination that this specific Investigative Report was public would carry "an 
-14 -
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implication that there is a chance that all such investigative reports could be made public 
as well, depending upon how badly the information is wanted/' thus possibly chilling the 
participation of witnesses and victims in unspecified future sexual harassment 
investigations. (R. 600). 
Although requested by the Morning News, the trial court did not address the issue 
of whether a redacted version of the Investigative Report could be released that 
segregated any non-public information and disclosed the public information, as provided 
in Section 307 of GRAMA. (R. 314 at 11; R. 593-602). 
The trial court's Memorandum Decision is the subject of this appeal. (R. 612-13). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court's refusal to order release of the Investigative Report - a document 
of manifest public interest about official misconduct and the operation of County 
government - was clearly incorrect. Neither of the two exceptions cited by the trial court 
permits the County to keep the Report from the public. 
First, the trial court erred in concluding that the Report is "private" because its 
release would constitute a "clearly unwarranted" invasion of Floros' personal privacy. 
The Report is not about Floros' personal life; it is about his alleged abuse of a public 
office, as well as whether County officials knew about such misconduct and ignored it. 
As such, the Report bears directly on "the conduct of the public's business." See Utah 
Code Ann. 63-2-102(l)(a). The significant public interest in disclosure of the Report, 
- 1 5 -
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which the trial court failed to consider, far outweighs the privacy interests, if any, in 
secrecy. 
Second, the trial court erred in concluding that the Report is "protected" because 
its release would interfere with future sexual harassment investigations. From the time 
the Report was first requested until the Court ruled on this matter, there was no pending 
investigation of Floros, nor did the County submit evidence of any other investigation or 
proceeding that would be compromised by release of the Report. Speculative interference 
with unspecified future investigations is insufficient to classify a record as protected 
under GRAMA. The trial court's ruling amounts to a categorical exception for all 
investigative reports - a sweeping policy decision that the Legislature has never made, 
and a dangerous expansion of permissible government secrecy. 
Finally, even if the Report did contain some information that the public is not 
entitled to inspect, which it does not, GRAMA requires the County to redact the non-
public information and release the public information. The trial court erred in failing to 
require such redaction. 
Because the Report is not properly classified as a private or protected record, it is 
public and the Morning News is entitled to judgment ordering its release. The trial court's 
decision should be reversed. 
185229 2 
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ARGUMENT 
I. The Investigative Report is Presumed to be a Public Record, and it was the 
County's Burden Below to Establish its Legal Exemption from Public 
Disclosure, 
The lodestar of GRAMA is the presumption of public access to government 
records. UA record is public unless otherwise expressly provided by statute." Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-2-201(2) (emphasis added). The Utah Legislature has rooted this presumption 
of public access in "the public's right of access to information concerning the conduct of 
the public's business . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-102(l)(a). Moreover, in enacting 
GRAMA, the Legislature expressly declared its intent to "promote the public's right of 
easy and reasonable access to unrestricted public records;" to "specify those conditions 
under which the public interest in restricting access to government records may outweigh 
the public's interest in access;" to "prevent abuse of confidentiality by governmental 
entities by permitting confidential treatment of records only as provided in this chapter;" 
and to "favor public access" in cases "where countervailing interests are of equal weight. 
. . ." Id. § 63-2-101(3). 
Utah's strong public policy favoring access to information concerning the conduct 
of the public's business - as reflected in GRAMA and its statutory predecessors - has 
long been recognized by this Court. In KUTVInc. v. Utah St. Bd. ofEduc, 689 P.2d 
1357 (Utah 1984), the Court stated that "[t]he presumption in cases such as this has 
always been public access, subject only to specific statutory restrictions, personal privacy 
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rights, and countervailing public policy The Court recognizes that it is the policy of 
this state that public records be kept open for public inspection in order to prevent secrecy 
in public affairs." Id. at 1361; see also Redding v. Brady, 606 P.2d 1193, 1196 (Utah 
1980) ("Both our state and federal constitutions contain assurances as to freedom of 
information and expression We regard it as in conformity with the law, and wise as 
a matter of policy, to require disclosure of information in which the public has an interest. 
. . . " ) ; Deputy Sheriffs Mut. Aid Ass yn of Salt Lake Co. v. Salt Lake Co. Deputy Sheriffs 
Merit Comm % 466 P.2d 836, 837 (Utah 1970) ("We believe and hold that they are public 
writings and that those interested should be able to examine them. This conclusion seems 
to reflect the intention of the legislature. . . ."). 
Because of the statutory presumption of access to government records, it was the 
County's burden below to come forward with evidence establishing that the specific 
record in question - the Investigative Report - is^pressly exempt |rom public disclosure 
under GRAMA. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-201(2) ("A record is public unless otherwise 
expressly provided by statute."); KUTV, 689 P.2d at 1361 (interpreting the statutory 
predecessor to GRAMA); see also United States v. Ray, 502 U.S. 164, 173 (1991) 
(holding under analogous federal FOIA statute that "the strong presumption in favor of 
disclosure places the burden on the agency to justify the withholding of any requested 
documents"). Failure of the non-moving party on summary judgment to come forward 
with evidence "sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's 
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case" entitles the moving party to judgment as a matter of law. Anderson Dev. Co. v. 
Tobias, 2005 UT 36, ^  23,116 P-2d 323 (internal quotation omitted). 
As demonstrated in the following sections, the trial court erred in concluding that 
the Investigative Report is properly classified as private or protected under GRAMA 
because the County failed to present facts establishing that such classification was proper. 
Because the County failed to rebut the statutory presumption of public access to the 
Investigative Report, the Morning News is entitled to summary judgement declaring the 
Report a public record. 
II. The Trial Court Erred in Concluding that the Independent Investigative 
Report Is a Private Record Under Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-302(2)(d). 
The trial court's application of Section 302(2)(d) contains two different errors. 
First, the trial court failed to give any consideration to the public interest in release of the 
Report. Such consideration is necessary to determine whether an invasion of privacy is 
"clearly unwarranted," as GRAMA requires. Second, the trial court's conclusion that 
release of the Report would unjustly invade the privacy of Floros - the perpetrator whose 
official misconduct was substantiated by the Report - has no basis in logic, law, or fact. 
Floros has no "privacy right" to conceal his substantiated sexual harassment of 
subordinate County employees, and there is no evidence in the record that release of the 
Report would unjustly invade the privacy of anyone else. The trial court's conclusion that 
the Report is a "private record" is erroneous and should be reversed. 
185229 2 
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A. The Trial Court Failed to Give Any Consideration to the Public 
Interest in Release of the Report 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-302(2)(d), a record may properly be classified 
as private only if it "contain[s] data on individuals the disclosure of which constitutes a 
clearly unwarranted invasion of p^rsonal^riva^." Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-302(2)(d). 
Because this exception only protects against the disclosure of data on individuals that 
would cause a "clearly unwarranted" invasion of personal privacy, it clearly does not 
preclude public access to all records that contain udata on individuals."3 Rather, the 
statute necessarily requires government entities to balance the "public's right of access to 
information concerning the conduct of the public's business" against "the right of privacy 
in relation to personal data gathered by governmental entities." Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-
102(1). 
Where, for example, the record concerns the conduct or misconduct of public 
officials, expenditure of public funds, or other "conduct of the public's business," as the 
Report does here, the public interest in disclosure is high. In such cases, the disclosure of 
information in the record that might prove embarrassing or nettlesome to public officials, 
3
 To read the statute so broadly would eviscerate the statutory presumption of 
access and secrete a multitude of government records that contain information about 
individuals but which are public under GRAMA, including, for example, police reports, 
arrest warrants, occupational and professional licenses, and notices of agency action. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-301(3) ("The following records are normally public, but to the 
extent a record is expressly exempt from disclosure, access may be restricted under . . . 
Section 63-2-302[.]"). 
185229.2 
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and which they may prefer to keep secret, nevertheless may be warranted. See, e.g., 
Redding v. Brady, 606 P.2d 1193 (1980) (ordering disclosure of salary information of 
state higher education employees notwithstanding claim of privacy invasion). 
The trial court, however, failed to give any consideration to the substantial public 
interests favoring disclosure of the Investigative Report. (R. 593-602; see also Tab D to 
Addendum). Had it done so, there is no question that the significant public interest in 
disclosure of the Report would have outweighed any privacy interests at stake. This is so 
for at least three reasons. 
First, the Report not only concerns the conAicLo£-the^pubhc' s business^ it goes to 
the heart of it. The Report concerns allegations that a high-ranking Salt Lake County 
official engaged in egregious and persistent sexual harassment of subordinate employees 
and that County officials knew about such misconduct and continued to employ him. (R. 
^ ^ ^ 314 at viii (citing R. 329); R. 441; R. 353-54; R. 371; see also R. 127-28 & attachment /I^rvnjf 
4 & thereto). Although the full content of the Report remains secret from the public, the 
partial summary contained in the Soltis Letter reveals that the Report (i) substantiates 
Rice's complaint against Floros, (ii) finds that Floros had sexually harassed Rice and 
punished her for not reciprocating his advances, and (iii) recommends that Floros be 
immediately terminated and considered ineligible for employment with the County. (R. 
314 at xxi (citing R. 330)). The public obviously has a compellingTnterest injeaming 
what the independent investigators found regarding the nature and extent of such 
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misconduct, what County managers knew about it, and what actions, if any, County 
managers took in response to it. 
v Second, the public has a compelling interest in scrutinizing the process that 
produced the Report. The District Attorney's handling of the Floros investigation was a 
matter of considerable public interest and controversy. (R. 314 at xxii-xxiii (citing R. 
322-24, R. 341-45, R. 347-52)). To allay fears of political cronyism and bias, and to 
"maintain complete objectivity and fair play," the District Attorney commissioned an 
independent panel of outside attorneys to investigate the allegations against Floros and 
report their findings, conclusions, and recommendations. (R. 314 at x (citing R. 329)). 
The Report is the product of that independent investigation. In this respect, the Report is 
significantly different than other, more routine internal investigative reports of alleged 
sexual harassment in the government workplace. Without access to the content of the 
Report, members of the public, including County employees who are entitled to a 
workplace free from sexual harassment, are left in the dark concerning whether the 
investigation was, in fact, objective, fair and thorough. The incomplete summary of the 
investigators' findings and recommendations contained in the Soltis Letter is wholly 
inadequate for this purpose. Release of the Report would provide a valuable public check 
on the integrity of the independent investigation and promote the public accountability of 
the elected officials responsible for the investigation, including, specifically, District 
Attorney Yocum and County Clerk Swensen. 
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the Report, which the District Attorney's Office characterized as "very well 
reasoned, fair and complete/' is the product of 100 hours of investigation and the 
expenditure of approximately $11,000 in taxpayer funds. (R. 314 at x (citing R. 239); see 
also R. 340 & Tab 2 thereto). In addition to the significant public interest in learning 
about official misconduct and promoting the accountability of public officials responsible 
for its investigation, the public has a right to see how its tax dollars are being spent. See, 
e.g., Redding v. Brady, 606 P.2d 1193, 1196 (Utah 1980) ("It seems to us that there is 
even a greater potential for evil in permitting public funds to be expended secretly.. . We 
regard it as in conformity with the law, and wise as a matter of policy, to require 
disclosure of information in which the public has an interest...."). 
As demonstrated below, these significant public interests favoring disclosure of the 
Investigative Report clearly outweigh the privacy interests, if any, implicated by the 
Report. Given the undisputed facts in the summary judgment record before it, the trial 
court erred in concluding otherwise. 
B. The Trial Court Erred in Concluding that Release of the Report Would 
Constitute a Clearly Unwarranted Invasion of Floros' Personal 
Privacy. 
Perhaps the most unusual conclusion in the trial court's decision is the holding that 
Floras has a personal privacy interest in concealing his misconduct as a public official -
VThirov 
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an argument that the County did not even attempt below.4 Even stranger, the court 
reached this conclusion not because it found that the Report contained baseless 
allegations against Floros, but rather because the Report substantiated Rice's allegations 
of official misconduct. (R. 314 at xxi (citing R. 329-30)). The court explained its 
reasoning as follows: 
Reason dictates that there exists within the contents of the full investigative 
report more express information concerning the alleged perpetrator [Floros] 
than exists in the Soltis letter, and more even-handed findings than can be 
found in the allegations contained in the [Marcia Rice] federal [lawsuit] or 
EEOC complaints. This is information, unique to the investigative report, 
the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of 
the alleged perpetrator's privacy. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
The trial court's conclusion is obviously in error. It is not an invasion of personal 
privacy to disclose the misconduct of a public official, much less the "clearly 
unwarranted" invasion required by GRAMA. The Report is not an expose on Floros' 
personal life. It concerns misconduct that occurred while Floros was acting in his official 
capacity as the Chief Deputy Clerk and his alleged abuse of that office to harass County 
employees. Floros has no reasonable expectation of privacy in concealing such conduct 
from the public. Numerous courts from other states have affirmed this principle in 
upholding release of investigative reports involving allegations of official misconduct. 
4
 The County instead argued that the Report should be kept secret to protect the 
privacy of witnesses interviewed for the Report, an assertion that also fails for reasons 
discussed below. 
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See, e.g. Fincher v. Georgia, 497 S.E.2d 632, 636 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998) (affirming release 
of an investigatory report in a sexual harassment case involving a public employee 
because the "public interest in obtaining the information outweighed [the accused's] 
privacy interest"); Antell v. Attorney Gen., 752 N.E.2d 823, 826 (Mass. Ct. App. 2001) 
("[T]he public interest in disclosing allegations of official misconduct at the conclusion of 
an investigation generally outweighs the privacy interests of participants in a cold 
investigation/'); Citizens to Recall Mayor James Whitlock v. Whitlock, 844 P.2d 74, 78 
(Mont. 1992) (holding that because public officials "occupy unique positions in regard to 
expectation of privacy/'disclosure of investigation into public official's alleged sexual 
harassment did not violate his right to privacy); Local 2849 v. Rock County, 689 N.W.2d 
644, 654-55 (Wis. Ct. App. 2004) (affirming release of investigatory records detailing law 
enforcement officers' use of department computers to view inappropriate images because 
officers' interest in privacy did not overcome "strong public interest in obtaining 
information regarding their activities while on duty"). 
This distinction between private and public conduct is reflected in the County's 
own GRAMA Ordinance, which favors public disclosure of records when the information 
sought concerns "public figures" or government workings and activities. See S.L. Co. 
Ord. 2050 §§ 4.5.3 and 4.5. 4. (R. 446). 
Moreover, the fact the Investigative Report contains more "even-handed" (i.e., 
credible) findings than the allegations contained in Rice's federal court or EEOC 
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complaints, which are already a matter of public record, undermines, rather than supports, 
the trial court's conclusion that release of the Report would constitute an unwarranted 
invasion of Floros' personal privacy. The public interest in learning about the more 
"even-handed" findings contained in the Investigative Report - a report the District 
Attorney's Office characterized as "very well reasoned, fair and complete" - is certainly 
equal to if not greater than its interest in learning about the bare allegations themselves. 
This is particularly so in light of the fact the independent investigators substantiated 
Rice's allegations, found that Floros had committed "egregious violations" of County 
policy, and would have recommended his immediate termination had he not resigned just 
days before the Report was issued. (R. 314 at xxi (citing R. 330)). 
GRAMA's privacy exception was never meant to shield official misconduct from 
the public view. The trial court's conclusion to the contrary was erroneous and should be 
reversed. 
C. There is No Evidence that Disclosure of the Investigative Report Would 
Constitute a Clearly Unwarranted Invasion of Any Other Person's 
Privacy. 
There is no other privacy interest that warrants classification of the Report as a 
private record. First, with respect to Rice, she has already disclosed her identity and made 
public the details of the alleged harassment. Her Notice of Claim against the County, the 
public EEOC Determination, and her complaint in federal court contain extensive, highly 
personal details concerning the alleged sexual harassment. (R. 314 at xxiii (citing R. 441-
- 2 6 -
185229.2 
42); R. 314 at xxiv (citing R. 355-73)). In addition, after filing her Notice of Claim, 
Rice's attorney made statements to the press about Rice's claim. (R. 341-42; R. 350-52 ). 
In making these disclosures and seeking damages and redress for her injury in the public 
courts, Rice has relinquished any privacy interest she may have had in the information 
contained in the Report. (R. 314 at xxiii (citing R. 441-42); R. 314 at xxiv (citing R. 355-
73)). 
Moreover, the fact that Rice never intervened and objected to disclosure of the 
Report during three County administrative appeal proceedings or in the court proceedings 
below demonstrates, at a minimum, that Rice is not averse to public disclosure of 
information concerning the misconduct of which she was a victim. 
Second, with respect to County Clerk Swensen, disclosure of the Report would not 
constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of her personal privacy because she is an elected 
County official and the Report concerns conduct that occurred in her office and on her 
watch. See cases cited supra at 24-25. Swensen has no legitimate privacy interest in 
preventing public scrutiny of her office or the conduct of her Chief Deputy. As 
demonstrated above, release of the Report will shed considerable light on the conduct of 
the public's business, and the public interest in disclosure is compelling. 
Finally, with respect to the other witnesses interviewed for the Report, there is no 
evidence that any witness has objected to disclosure. Indeed, at least two County 
employees interviewed by investigators - Amy DaSilva and Audrey Sharpsteen - have 
- 2 7 -
185229 2 
stated they support release of the Report to prevent retaliation against witnesses who 
cooperated with investigators and to shed light on Floros' conduct and the workings of 
the County Clerk's Office. See Memorandum in Support of Motion for Leave to File 
Brief of Amicus Curiae Amy DaSilva and Audrey Sharpsteen (Oct. 5, 2006) at 3. 
Moreover, for reasons that will become obvious to the Court upon review of the Report, 
and which are discussed in the Morning News' Sealed Submission, release of the Report 
would not cause a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy of any of these 
individuals. See Morning News' Sealed Submission at 9-12. 
In sum, the County failed to present evidence on summary judgment sufficient to 
conclude that disclosure of the Report would constitute "a clearly unwarranted invasion 
of personal privacy," as required under Section 302(2)(d). The trial court's conclusion 
that release of the Report would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of Floros' 
personal privacy is wholly unsupported by the record, erroneous as a matter of law, and 
should be reversed. 
III. The Trial Court Erred in Concluding that the Independent Investigative 
Report Was a Protected Record Under Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-304(9). 
The only other basis for the trial court's refusal to release the Report is its 
conclusion that the Report is a "protected" record under Section 304(9) of GRAMA. 
That section provides protected status for the following records if properly classified: 
records created or maintained for civil, criminal, or administrative 
enforcement purposes, if release of the records: 
185229.2 
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(a) reasonably could be expected to interfere with investigations undertaken 
for enforcement, discipline, licensing, certification, or registration purposes; 
(b) reasonably could be expected to interfere with audits, disciplinary, or 
enforcement proceedings; . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-304(9) (emphasis added). 
At the time the Morning News submitted its GRAMA request for the Investigative 
Report, the independent investigation had concluded; Floros had retired from County 
employment; the District Attorney had reported the investigators' summary of findings 
and disposition to Rice, concluding that "administrative-disciplinary action" was 
unnecessary; and Rice had filed her federal civil rights lawsuit against the County, Floros 
and Swensen. (R. 314 at xxi (citing R. 329-31); R. 314 at xxv-xxvi (citing R. 3, 28)). 
Accordingly, release of the Report could not interfere with investigation or disciplinary 
proceedings related to Floros, as the trial court found. (R. 598-99). 
The investigation of Floros, however, was the only investigation specified in the 
record. The County presented no evidence of any other specific investigation that would 
be compromised by release of the Report; indeed, it presented no evidence of any other 
investigation at all. Instead, the County proposed a sweeping expansion of Section 
304(9), one which does not require evidence of any actual investigation. According to the 
County's interpretation, a record can be classified asjjrotected based solely on the chance 
that its release might interfere with some hypothetical investigation some time in the 
future. Based on this speculation, the County claimed that Section 304(9) applied. 
185229.2 
- 2 9 -
Remarkably, the trial court accepted the County's argument. It di<i not require any 
evidence of an actual investigation that would be compromised by release of the Report, 
nor did it analyze whether release of this Report would interfere with future 
investigations.5 Instead, the court saw itself as issuing a categorical ruling on all sexual 
harassment investigative reports, stating that, "in the public's eyes," a determination that 
this specific Investigative Report was public "carries an implication that there is a chance 
that all such investigative reports could be made public as well, depending upon how 
badly the information is wanted," thus possibly chilling the participation of witnesses and 
victims in some future, hypothetical sexual harassment investigation. (R. 600). 
The trial court's interpretation is a faeathtakinj^xpansion of the investigation 
exception, and it should be rejected by this Court for at least two reasons: (1) it facilitates 
unjust government secrecy based on nothing more than speculation, as numerous courts 
interpreting the analogous provision of the federal Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") 
have concluded; and (2) it creates a categorical exception for all sexual harassment 
investigative reports, which is a policy decision for the Legislature, not the courts. 
5
 Ironically, in this case, the opposite is more likely true. Public disclosure of the 
Investigative Report is more likely to foster confidence among the public and County 
employees that the County takes allegations of sexual harassment seriously, investigates 
them thoroughly, and holds public officials accountable for their conduct. This is 
particularly so where, as here, the alleged perpetrator is a high-ranking County official 
accused of harassing subordinates. Victims and witnesses are more likely to come 
forward and report sexual harassment if they see evidence that the County takes seriously 
sexual harassment allegations against such officials and investigates them thoroughly. 
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A. Section 304(9) is Limited to Pending or Contemplated Investigations or 
Proceedings. 
In Badran v. United Sates, 652 F. Supp. 1437, 1438 (N.D. 111. 1987), Badran, an 
immigrant, filed suit under FOIA to obtain disclosure of all of the documents in her 
immigration file, including a report of the INS's investigation of her case. The 
government denied access to the investigative report under an exemption in FOIA 
analogous to Section 304(9) of GRAMA, which exempted from disclosure "investigatory 
records compiled by law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production 
of such records would (A) interfere with enforcement proceedings[.]" 5 U.S.C. § 
552(b)(7)(A). 
Like the County here, the INS conceded that no pending or contemplated 
enforcement proceeding would be endangered by release of the INS investigative report. 
It nevertheless argued that the classification was proper because the report contained 
information that the INS "could use against a person who might someday violate 
immigration laws." Badran, 652 F. Supp. at 1440. 
The Badran court had little difficulty rejecting this argument: 
This position is bewildering and indefensible. An agency may not assert the 
"enforcement proceedings" exception to FOIA "when there is no 
enforcement proceeding then pending or contemplated." No court has ever 
held to the contrary. If an agency could withhold information whenever it 
could imagine circumstances where the information might have some 
bearing on some hypothetical enforcement proceeding, the FOIA would be 
meaningless; all information could fall into that category. The INS must 
disclose the Report of Investigation. 
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Id. (citations omitted). 
Numerous other courts have agreed. See, e.g., NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber 
Co., 437 U.S. 214, 230-32, 98 S. Ct. 2311 (1978) (emphasizing that Congress did not 
intend for the "enforcement proceedings" exception to "endlessly protect material simply 
because it was in an investigatory file"); Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Dep 't of Energy, 
617 F.2d 854, 870 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (holding that "enforcement proceedings" exception 
only exempts from disclosure information that is "still under investigation or being 
actively pursued," not "yellowing documents contained in long-closed files"); Nat'I Sec. 
Archive v. F.B.I., 759 F. Supp. 872, 883 (D.D.C. 1991) (concluding that "enforcement 
proceedings" exception "cannot justify withholding unless the material withheld relate[s] 
to a concrete prospective law enforcement proceeding" (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
The reasoning in Badran and other cases construing the FOIA exception is equally 
applicable here. A government entity relying on Section 304(9) to deny access to a record 
on the ground that it would interfere with an investigation or proceeding must identify a 
pending or contemplated investigation that would be interfered with by release of the 
record. There was no concrete investigation or proceeding at issue in this case and 
therefore the exception does not apply. To read the exception otherwise, and as the trial 
court did below, would allow any record relating to "civil, criminal, or administrative 
enforcement purposes" to be concealed because release of any such record could 
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hypothetically chill the participation of victims and witnesses in such investigations or 
proceedings. Such a construction would render GRAMA, and its presumption of public 
access to government records, meaningless. 
B. The Trial Court's Interpretation Creates a Categorical Exception for 
All Sexual Harassment Investigative Reports, 
The trial court's interpretation is not only improvident as a matter of government 
secrecy, it is also flawed analytically. GRAMA requires access determinations to be 
made on a case-by-case basis, considering the specific record in question and whether its 
release would cause harm to those countervailing public interests expressly identified in 
the exceptions to public disclosure. It does not ask the court to create categorical 
exceptions or decide the fate of all similar records. That, however, is precisely what the 
trial court did in this case, asserting that a determination that this specific Investigative 
Report was public "carries an implication that there is a chance that all such investigative 
reports could be made public as well, depending upon how badly the information is 
wanted[.]" (R. 600). From this "implication" of a "chance," the trial court concluded that 
release of the Report might chill witnesses who want confidentiality from participating in 
future investigations, and thus the Report is a protected record.6 
6
 Significantly, the County presented no evidence that the independent 
investigators in this case promised confidentiality to any witnesses or that the 
investigators ever expected the Report to remain confidential. (R. 555). In fact, for 
reasons explained in the Morning News' Sealed Submission, the content of the Report 
supports the opposite conclusion. 
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If that is all that Section 304(9) requires, then no sexual harassment investigative 
report would ever be released. Indeed, no investigative report of any nature would be 
released, since the government could always raise the "chance" that a future investigation 
might occur, and future witnesses might know about this particular ruling, and those 
witnesses might be chilled from participating if they happen to want confidentiality. 
Even worse, the trial court implied that this categorical secrecy classification would exist 
indefinitely, "irrespective of the passage of time, and the change of circumstances." (R. 
599). 
While putting all investigative reports off limits to the public forever may arguably 
be a plausible policy decision, that is a policy choice for the Legislature, not the courts. 
The Legislature did not make that choice in GRAMA. Under GRAMA, "[a]ll records are 
public unless expressly classified otherwise by statute." Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-201(2) 
(emphasis added). There is no provision in GRAMA expressly classifying as non-public 
investigative reports of sexual harassment in government workplaces, much less 
classifying as non-public the independently commissioned Investigative Report at issue 
here. 
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In this case, there is no evidence that release of this specific Report would interfere 
in any way with any specific investigation. Given this lack of evidence, the trial court's 
conclusion that Section 304(9) applies is erroneous and should be reversed.7 
IV. The Content of the Independent Investigative Report Supports the 
Conclusion that it is a Public Record. 
[See "SEALED SUBMISSION OF APPELLANT CONCERNING CONTENT OF 
INVESTIGATIVE REPORT" (Submitted Under Seal).] 
V. The Trial Court Erred in Failing to Redact any Non-Public Information in 
the Report and Release the Public Information. 
Finally, even if there were some part of the Report that contained information to 
which the public is not entitled, which there is not, GRAMA requires the County to 
segregate information to which the public is entitled and release that information. Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-2-307. Neither the County nor the trial court made any attempt to do so 
7
 The County argued half-heartedly below that its concealment of the 
Investigative Report also was proper under Utah Code Ann. Sec. 63-2-304(17), which 
protect records constituting attorney work-product. (R. 555 at 6-7). The trial court did 
not rely on this exception in upholding the County's nondisclosure, and the exception 
clearly is inapplicable to the Report. The County admitted that the Report was prepared 
pursuant to the County's sexual harassment policy, not in preparation for litigation with 
Rice. (R. 555 at xxi, f 4; see also R. 314 at xvii (citing R. 127-28 & attachment thereto at 
17; id. at 1). The Report does not contain the legal impression of attorneys preparing a 
litigation defense but rather reports the findings of an independent investigation of 
alleged sexual harassment by a County official. (R. 314 at x (citing R. 329)). And, if that 
were not obvious enough, the County's disclosure of the Report to Rice and her counsel 
during the federal court litigation is patently inconsistent with the County's after-the-fact 
assertion that the Report constitutes attorney work-product. (R. 314 at xxv (citing R. 159-
73); R. 134 n. 2). 
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in this case, instead insisting that the entire Report should be kept secret. Should this 
Court determine there is some information in the Report to which the public is not 
entitled, the Court should order redaction of such information and release the remainder 
of the Report pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-307. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, and those contained in the Morning News' Sealed 
Submission, the Memorandum Decision of the trial court should be reversed, and the 
matter remanded for entry of judgment in favor of the Morning News. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 12. .day of October 2006. 
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS 
Jeffrey 1-Hunt I 1 [M 
"Btavid Q. Reymanir 
Mich^eljT. Hoppe 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
Deseret Morning News 
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